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Abstract 
This article analyzes the relations between political parties and parliament, and the 
specific issue of the parliamentary mandate. It examines the issue of the increasing 
influence of political parties and how this causes the weakening of modern parliaments, 
and also changes the nature of the parliamentary mandate from a free to an almost 
imperative mandate. We focus on specific instruments political parties have developed 
to establish and maintain full control over their representatives. We look into the 
specific experience of Montenegro and Serbia and the way these countries have changed 
their political system during the transition from communism. Among other factors that 
influence the weakening of the parliament, we focus primarily on the electoral system. 
The current proportional electoral system (proportional with closed lists) in both 
countries causes a lack of legitimacy for the members of parliament (MPs), which is 
why we analyze the effects of an electoral reform in order to strengthen the position of 
MPs. The mechanism of the transition to a preferential proportional electoral system is 
analyzed, as well as the benefits and disadvantages of this kind of reform proposal.
         
                
Keywords: Montenegro, Serbia, parliamentary mandate, electoral system, EU 
integration. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this article is to provide an answer to the question of 
how political parties influence the nature of the parliamentary mandate, and the 
power of the parliament in general, in post-communist countries such as 
Montenegro and Serbia. After a brief review of the theoretical literature that 
supports the thesis that the modern parliament is being marginalized, the 
argumentation takes issue with the electoral system, which is the main 
independent variable that affects the significance and activity of MPs and the 
power of parliament in general, as a dependent variable. Among other 
independent variables, this study examines the instruments and methods of 
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political parties through which they fight for the exercise of control over their 
MPs. Furthermore, EU integration is considered as another variable since it has 
led to a transfer of a large part of legislative competencies from the national to 
the European level, and it has also affected the balance of power between 
national parliaments and their governments in favour of national executives
1
. 
Have political parties indeed reshaped the nature of the representative 
parliamentary mandate in transitional Montenegro and Serbia? Can we notice 
any changes over time in how political parties approach the fight for control 
over their MPs? What could be the effects of establishing a proportional 
electoral system with open lists on the autonomy of MPs and the strengthening 
of parliament? These are the fundamental questions that we set out to answer in 
this article.     
From a methodological point of view, we use a case-study approach, 
which is the intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a 
larger class of (similar) units, where the unit connotes a spatially bounded 
phenomenon observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of 
time
2
. Our research framework involves the parliamentary regimes of both 
Montenegro and Serbia, and takes into account their progress towards European 
integration. Therefore, this case study can be useful to other countries facing 
similar challenges in this process. Besides, their situation reflects the problems 
in the functioning of parliaments in young democracies in the post-communist 
transition period. A further justification for this case study is the fact that certain 
instruments such as blank-form resignations and instances of violation of the 
constitution show how far parties are prepared to go in order to keep their 
influence on MPs. This article is divided into three sections. In the first section, 
we briefly present the theoretical framework concerning the importance and the 
power of parliament in the contemporary parliamentary system, in relation to 
the influence of political parties, government, and the process of integration. 
Secondly, the analysis focuses on the post-communist experience of 
Montenegro and Serbia with regard to the nature of the parliamentary mandate. 
The third section analyzes the possible effects of changes of the electoral 
system in response to the issue of the legislature’s fading power, before offering 
some concluding remarks. 
                                               
* Petar Šturanović is a Teaching Assistant at the Constitutional Law Department, the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Montenegro. His academic interests are: 
constitutional law, the parliamentary system, and the study of the political system. He 
studies the role of a modern parliament with its strength and weaknesses, particularly in 
the South - Eastern European states (pekos@t-com.me). 
1  Katrin Auel and Arthur Benz, “The Politics of Adaptation: Europeanisation of National 
Parliamentary Systems”, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3-4, 2005, pp. 372–393, 
pp. 372–373. 
2  John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?’’, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, 2004, pp. 341–354, p. 342. 
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The Role Of The Modern Parliament In Consolidated 
Democracies: A Theoretical Overview 
 
The modern parliament suffers from an increasing trend towards 
marginalization, and long gone is the time when it found itself at the centre of 
the political system. It is important to note, though, that historically the function 
of the parliament has always been overemphasized. For example, Walter 
Bagehot in his capital work “The English Constitution”, in addition to its 
legislative function and the function of forming government, mentions the 
elective, expressive, teaching, informing functions of parliament
3
. This trend 
towards degradation of the parliament was already recognized in the previous 
century. Even in societies with a substantial history of parliamentary 
democracy, the parliament has become increasingly marginalized in a world 
characterized by globalization, the appearance of many new, diverse 
policymaking areas, radical specialization, and an explosion of new, vigorous 
political agents, namely NGOs
4
. First and foremost, however, is the fact that the 
balance of power between the parliament and government has been disrupted. 
Philip Norton’s classification of legislatures identified: Policy-making 
parliaments, which can modify or reject measures brought forward by the 
executive, and can formulate and substitute policies of their own (e.g. a 
Member’s Bill); Policy-influencing parliaments, which can modify or reject 
measures brought forward by the executive but cannot formulate and substitute 
policies of their own; and Parliaments with little or no policy effect, which can 
neither modify or reject measures brought forward by the executive, nor 
formulate and substitute policies of their own
5
. Some parliaments are better 
prepared to face the challenge of marginalization. Legislatures with strong 
committees, such as the Nordic parliaments, the Italian Camera dei Deputati and 
the German Bundestag, are normally ranked as the most powerful in Europe. 
However, despite such investment in committee work, governments remain 
                                               
3  Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1873, 
pp. 118–121. 
4  Tom Burns and Masoud Kamali, “The Evolution of Parliaments - A Comparative, 
Historical Perspective on Assemblies and Political Decision-making”, Gerard Delanty, 
Engin F. Isin, and Margaret R. Somers (eds.), Handbook of Historical Sociology, London, 
Sage Publications, 2002, p. 16. 
5  Philip Norton and Cristina Leston–Bandeira, Parliamentary Institution - Basic Concepts, 
United Nations Development Programme - Viet Nam, 2005, p. 6. Norton and Leston–
Bandeira enumerate a number of criteria that contribute towards understanding the 
relationship between Executives and Legislatures: Size of government’s majority in 
parliament; number of parties in opposition, as well as the size of these parties; Level of 
party discipline; Average duration of governments; Government’s and parliament’s 
legislative powers; Legislative output; Scrutiny instruments available to parliament; 
Scrutiny instruments activated by parliament; Government’s and parliament’s powers in 
agenda setting. Ibidem, p. 10. 
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firmly in control of the parliamentary agenda and the passage of legislation
6
. 
Tsebelis argues that the interaction between the executives and legislatures is 
regulated by the rules of agenda setting. According to him, it is precisely 
through a revision of the agenda that the government establishes domination 
over parliament in the legislative sphere
7
. This describes Olson’s ’90% rule’, 
that in most cases the 90% rule applies with 90% of legislative activity being 
initiated by the executive, which gets 90% of what it wants
8
.  
 Recent literature on parliaments refers to the process of integration as a 
factor that has affected the powers and the institutional position of national 
parliaments, through the transfer of legislative powers to the EU level
9
. Further, 
according to the so-called ‘deparliamentarization’ thesis, the development of 
European integration has led to the erosion of parliamentary control over the 
executive branch, which has made national parliaments the main victims of 
European integration
10
. Moravcsik identifies four causal mechanisms behind the 
growth of executive power: the executive monopoly over policy initiation; 
advantages enjoyed by executives by virtue of the legal form of EC decisions 
and the procedures by which they are ratified; superior access to EU-related 
information; justifications for government policies through the connection 
between European integration and the principled belief in the ideals of peace, 
prosperity and cosmopolitanism – the three most fundamental sources of 
"European" ideological legitimacy
11
. However, there are variations in how 
national parliaments have reacted to EU integration. Factors that explain such 
heterogeneity include national path dependencies, the domestic institutional 
strength of national parliaments (or lack thereof), and the degree of 
                                               
6  John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio, “Introduction. Deparliamentarization and European 
Integration”, John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio (eds.), National Parliaments within the 
Enlarged European Union: From ‘victims’ of integration to competitive actors?, London 
and New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 8. 
7  George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2002, p. 139. 
8  David Olson and Philip Norton (eds.), “Legislatures in Democratic Transition”, Journal of 
Legislative Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, p. 7. 
9  In the meantime, EU institutions and their decision-making procedures suffer from a lack 
of democracy, which Weiler, Haltern and Mayer call ‘democratic deficit'. Joseph Weiler, 
Ulrich Haltern and Franz Mayer, “European Democracy and its Critique, West European 
Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1995, pp. 4–39, p. 6. Ladrech argues that there is an additional 
dimension to the democratic deficit, one that is inside political parties. Robert Ladrech, 
“National Political Parties and European Governance: The Consequences of ‘Missing in 
Action’ '', West European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2007, pp. 945-960, p. 953. 
10  Tapio Raunio, “The Gatekeepers of European Integration? The Functions of National 
Parliaments in the EU Political System”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 33, No. 3, 
2011, pp. 303–321, p. 304. 
11  Andrew Moravcsik, “Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics 
and International Cooperation”, CES Working Paper Series, No. 52, Centre for European 
Studies, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 1–79, pp. 15–25. 
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Eurosceptical opinion at national level
12
. Thomas Winzen argues that European 
integration mostly affects and is affected by (1) parliamentary influence on 
legislation and (2) parliamentary links to citizens
13
. More recently, scholars 
have pointed to the dualist nature of Europeanization for MPs, which is both 
passive (Europeanization seen as something that simply happens to 
parliamentarians) and active (Europeanization considered as a process of 
adaptation or reaction of parliamentary behaviour to European integration
14
. 
According to Klaus Goetz and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling the integration 
process produces contradictory effects: de-parlamentarisation, as national 
parliaments have ceded powers to the EU and to domestic executives, and the 
opposite, i.e., re-parlamentarisation, as national legislatures have reasserted 
themselves in the integration process; growing bureaucratisation, as national 
bureaucrats dominate domestic EU-related policymaking, and the opposite, i.e., 
politicisation, as executive politicians take control of the EU policy process; 
increasing centralisation in national governments, with the emergence of 
powerful EU core executives, and the opposite, i.e., progressive diffusion of 
integration effects throughout the political and administrative parts of the 
executive
15
. Francesko Duina and Michael Oliver argue that the EU has also 
benefited national parliaments, mostly by setting legal precedents in areas 
previously beyond the remit of national parliaments, and they conclude that by 
so doing, the EU opens the door for unprecedented national legislative 
activity
16
. However, European integration cannot be blamed or praised for all 
temporal trends affecting national legislatures. Rather, it is the added effect of 
integration that needs to be focused on
17
.   
 According to Cristina Chiva, EU institutions, policies and norms shape 
legislative institutionalisation to the extent that the adaptive pressures of the EU 
accession process in candidate countries have an impact on (a) the wider 
context within which parliaments work (in particular the constitutional 
                                               
12  Gavin Barrett, Evolving Role of National Parliaments in the European Union: Ireland as 
a case study, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2018, p. 55. 
13  Thomas Winzen, “Political Integration and National Parliaments in Europe”, Living 
Reviews in Democracy, Vol. 2, 2010, pp. 1–14, p. 1. 
14  Sylvain Brouard, Olivier Costa and Thomas König, “Delors’ Myth: The Scope and Impact 
of the Europeanization of Law Production”, Sylvain Brouard, Olivier Costa and Thomas 
König (eds.), The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures, New York, Springer, 2012, 
pp. 1–19, p. 3. 
15  Klaus Goetz and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, “The Europeanisation of National Political 
Systems: Parliaments and Executives”, Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 3, 
 No. 2, 2008, pp. 1–30, p. 5. 
16  Francesko Duina and Michael Oliver, “National Parliaments in the European Union: 
Are There Any Benefits to Integration?” European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2005, 
pp. 173–195, p. 190. 
17  Tapio Raunio and Simon Hix, “Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration 
and parliamentary government”, West European Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, pp. 142–
168, p. 145. 
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framework and the crystallisation of party ideologies) and (b) parliamentary 
agendas and structures (especially the quantity and contents of legislative output 
and the committee system
18
. The goal of many Eastern European states of 
joining the EU has also led to the adoption of fast-track legislative procedures, 
further reducing parliaments’ independent input into the policy-making 
process
19
. The legislative bodies of candidate countries like Montenegro and 
Serbia are even more affected by the integration process. The organizations to 
which Montenegro and Serbia aspire to be members of, and above all else the 
European Union as the subject sui generis, inﬂuence the laws to be adopted and 
the dynamics of the legislative process, regardless of the fact that those 
organizations have sometimes been said to have a poor knowledge of 
Montenegrin or Serbian society
20
. The key goal for their political elite
21
 in the 
process of EU integration was to enter as soon as possible. This further 
aggravated the existing degradation of the legislature and continually put 
unbearable pressure on parliament to incorporate the acquis communautaire in 
as short a time as possible
22
. Parliamentarians in Western parliamentary 
democracies can at times be very much united against a government, yet for all 
practical purposes they are far more accurately treated as multi-member 
assemblies divided into political parties who are either in government or in 
opposition. When a parliament acts by majority, and when that majority 
supports the government, then the theoretical government-versus-parliament 
duality quickly diminishes
23. Instead of this “old dualism”, parliamentary 
systems are characterised by a “new dualism” between the executive and its 
supportive majority, on the one hand, and the parliamentary opposition, on the 
other. Party discipline depends on the content of the legal proposal. Particularly 
in EU affairs we can expect the motivation of the majority loyally to follow 
                                               
18  Cristina Chiva, “The Institutionalisation of Post-Communist Parliaments: Hungary and 
Romanian Comparative Perspective”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2007, pp. 
187–211, p. 194. 
19  Petr Kopecký, “Power to the Executive! The Changing Executive–Legislative Relations 
in Eastern Europe”, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2-3, 2004, pp. 142–153, 
p. 151. 
20  Boris Vukićević, Stevo Muk and Zlatko Vujović, Study: Strengthening of the Role and 
Function of the Parliament of Montenegro in the Decision-Making Process, Faculty of 
Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 2012, p. 18. 
21  Political parties in Montenegro wholeheartedly and without any exception support the 
country’s European integration. Ivan Vuković, “The Determinants of Party Consensus on 
European Integration in Montenegro”, Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 4-5, 
2015, pp. 74-98, p. 82. 
22
  Petar Šturanović, Zakonodavna nadležnost skupštine u savremenom parlamentarnom 
sistemu (Legislative Competence of the Assembly in Contemporary Parliamentary 
System), Službeni list, Podgorica, 2017, pp. 30–31. 
23  Philipp Kiiver, “European scrutiny in national parliaments”, John O’Brennan and Tapio 
Raunio (eds.), National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union: From 
“victims” of integration to competitive actors?, pp. 66–78, London and New York, 
Routledge, 2007, pp. 73–74. 
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their government to be indeed lower compared to what would be the case in 
domestic politics, since the agenda to be decided upon does not originate from a 
programme or manifesto agreed by the government and the majority parties
24
 . 
In parliamentary democracy there is an upward chain of delegation from 
voters to parliaments and to governments, and a corresponding downward chain 
of accountability from the cabinet to the parliament and ultimately to the 
electorate
25
. However, in modern parliamentarism, the constitution provides that 
the government is accountable to parliament, but in reality it is to the political 
parties, and more precisely to the party leaders, that the government is truly 
accountable. For example, in the early 1990s Margaret Thatcher was forced to 
resign from her Prime Minister position after she had lost the Conservative 
(Tory) Party leadership election. Despite the fact that Thatcher’s government 
had a solid majority in the House of Commons at the time, she had to step down 
in favour of John Major, the new Tory leader. Once Major established control over 
the party, it was only a matter of time before he would become Prime Minister
26
. 
The main factor causing this marginalization of the modern parliament are 
political parties. Maurice Duverger argued that political parties changed the nature 
of parliamentarism and concluded that the one who understands classic 
constitutional law does not understand the essence of political parties, but the one 
who knows how political parties function, despite a lack of understanding of 
constitutional law, has an incomplete, but correct picture
27. Duverger’s claim is 
proved correct, considering that political parties are becoming more and more the 
true centre of the decision making process, while MPs exercise the pure 
transmission of the political will of their party leaders. The greater the ability of a 
party to control the political future of its members in the legislature (through ballot 
access, funding resources, internal assignments or other critical benefits), the lower 
individual autonomy of the MPs will be
28
. Parliament becomes a legislative body 
which votes for proposed laws which have already been previously negotiated. 
Political parties de facto decide whether a certain bill will become law, which 
inevitably leads to a reduced, merely finalizing legislative function of parliament
29
. 
                                               
24  Katrin Auel, “Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the 
Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs”, European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 
2007, pp. 487–504, pp. 491–492. 
25  Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjørn Bergman, Delegation and Accountability 
in Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 64–65. 
26  David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How 
the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior, Cambridge, 
Cambridge  University Press, 2010, p. 98. 
27  Duverger Maurice, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern 
State, London, Methuen, 1954, p. 387. 
28  Ammie Kreppel, “Typologies and Classifications”, Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld and 
Kaare Strøm (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, pp. 82–101, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 94. 
29  Zoran Stojiljković, “Partije u parlamentu” (“Parties in Parliament”), Vukašin Pavlović and 
Slaviša Orlović (eds.), Dileme i izazovi parlamentarizma (The dilemmas and challenges 
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This is changing the nature of the MPs’ mandate from a free representational to an 
imperative mandate bound by the orders from political parties. 
The strength and the character of MPs depend on the nature of their mandate. 
An imperative mandate involves the right of the people to give binding instructions 
to their representatives, the right to demand reports of the representatives' work and 
the right to recall them. A number of constitutions, for example, the French 
Constitution of 1958, directly prohibit imperative mandates
30
. The German 
Constitution takes a similar approach, stipulating that members of the Bundestag 
shall be representatives of the whole nation, that they shall not be bound by orders 
or instructions, and that they shall be responsible only to their conscience
31
. The 
imperative mandate has now become the exception, but this does not mean that it 
has completely disappeared. Indeed, it still exists in many developing countries 
such as Indonesia, Cuba, Fiji, Namibia and the Seychelles
32
. By contrast, the 
concept of the free representational mandate considers that the members’ right to 
vote belongs to them alone; members represent the entire electorate; and MPs 
cannot be recalled. MPs are not representatives of only part of the population, 
which precludes them from defending special interests; MPs exercise their 
mandates freely and are not bound by any undertakings given before their election 
or instructions received from the voters during their mandate
33
. In representative 
government, the central normative problem of democracy is often restated in terms 
of the relationship between citizens and their representatives: how closely must a 
representative’s votes on legislation correspond to the preferences and will of his or 
her constituents?
34
 
 
 
The Montenegrin And Serbian Post–Communist Experience:  
The Nature Of The Parliamentary Mandate 
 
This section examines the case of Montenegro and Serbia, two countries 
that were part of the former communist Yugoslavia and subsequently formed a 
common federal state in 1992 which was eventually dissolved after the 
Montenegrin referendum of 2006, when both countries became independent 
                                                                                                                   
of parliamentarism), pp. 129–139, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade 
and  Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Belgrade, 2007, p. 107. 
30  “Any specific instruction to a Member of Parliament (from an outside body) is null and 
void.” French Constitution of 1958, article 27. 
31  Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949, article 38. 
32  Marc Van der Hulst, The Parliamentary Mandate – A Global Comparative Study, Inter–
Parliamentary Union, Geneva, 2000, pp. 9–10. 
33  Olivier Duhamel and Yves Meny, Dictionnaire Constitutionnel (Constitutional 
Dictionary), Paris, PUF, 1992, pp. 619–620. 
34  Andrew Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in 
the Study of Political Representation and Democracy”, American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 103, No. 2, 2009, pp. 214–230, p. 214. 
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states. These two states are experiencing similar difficulties in transforming 
their institutions into democratic ones, mainly owing to the lack of a democratic 
tradition. Both started a democratic transition in the early 1990s
35
, and like other 
socialist states, they did not practise any kind of separation of powers. Instead, 
they had a legislative body which was considered the highest political body of 
state power, legally superior to the executive, and judicial branches of 
government
36
. In reality, they were practically governed by the single, 
omnipotent communist party. At the begining of the transition to democracy, 
they chose parliamentarism over other types of organization of powers because 
every country leaving any kind of dictatorship had no practical choice other 
than parliamentarism
37
.    
In the following section, the focus will be on the relation between the 
parliament and political parties, particularly on the specific issue of the 
parliamentary mandate, because the relations between the legislative body and 
political parties were deeply affected by the nature of the mandate. Both 
Montenegro and Serbia had an imperative mandate, which was an integral part 
of the ruling communist ideology at that time. During the political transition of 
the 1990s, they chose the free representational mandate over the imperative one. 
However, by changing the imperative mandate into one which is only formally 
free, the essence has not changed: instead of the electoral base, it is the political 
party that has become the mandator
38
. 
The question is, how did political parties change the nature of the 
parliamentary mandate in Montenegro and Serbia? It could be argued that it 
primarily has to do with the electoral system that the parties have created 
through their MPs in order to achieve their own domination. Basically, electoral 
systems determine the means by which votes are translated into seats in the 
process of electing politicians into office
39
. There are two main types of 
electoral systems, proportional and non–proportional. In proportional systems, 
                                               
35  A large number of former communist countries have passed through long and turbulent 
transitional processes, in which case it is more precise to talk about two transitions rather 
than a single one. This group of countries would include Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, 
Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Montenegro and Serbia. Srđan Darmanović, “Duga tranzicija u 
Crnoj Gori – od polukompetitivnih izbora do izborne demokratije” (“Long transition in 
Montenegro - from semi-competitive elections to electoral democracy”), Veselin 
Pavićević (ed.), Izbori i izborno zakonodavstvo u Crnoj Gori 1990–2006 (Elections and 
Electoral Legislation in Montenegro 1990–2006), pp. 83–100, CEMI, Podgorica, 2007, p. 83. 
36  Robert K. Furtak, The Political Systems of the Socialist States, New York, St. Martin’s 
Press, 1986, p. 13. 
37  Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, New York, New York 
University Press, 1997, p. 132. 
38
  Petar Šturanović, Zakonodavna nadležnost skupštine u savremenom parlamentarnom 
sistemu (Legislative Competence of the Assembly in Contemporary Parliamentary 
System),  pp. 244–245. 
39  David Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 5. 
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great effort is made to ensure that the number of seats each party wins reflects 
as closely as possible the number of votes it has received. In other systems, 
greater importance is attached to ensuring that one party has a clear majority of 
seats over its competitors, thereby (hopefully) increasing the prospect of strong 
and stable government and, by extension, a stable political system
40
. 
Both Montenegro and Serbia have proportional electoral systems with 
closed lists, a different election threshold of 3% in Montenegro, and of 5% in 
Serbia, and a single nationwide constituency. Therefore, the proportionality 
coefficient is high, despite using the D’Hondt electoral formula, which is 
known as one of the least proportional electoral formulae
41
. However, the main 
feature of both Montenegro’s and Serbia’s electoral systems, as well as the main 
source of defects, are closed candidate lists. Such an electoral system has its 
advantages: to the party elite, which can draw up their lists in such a way as to 
maximize the chances for their preferred candidates to be elected; and clear 
advantages to the system wherever a party wants to increase its proportion of 
female MPs or, perhaps, to guarantee a minimum proportion of seats to ethnic 
minorities
42
. On the other hand, the proportional system (with closed lists) in existence 
in Montenegro and Serbia has clear disadvantages. Slaviša Orlović found that 
there are four fundamental deficiencies in the electoral model in Serbia (which 
also applies to Montenegro): territorial under–representation; fragmented 
parliament; semi–direct or semi–indirect electoral system comprising lists which are closed 
for the voters and open for the parties; imperative mandate and blank-form resignations
43
. 
The problem with national–level representation is that it reduces the 
contact between representatives and voters. There is a danger that the 
geographical location of MPs (either by birth or residence) may be concentrated 
in the urban, more populated areas, leaving whole swathes of the population 
unrepresented
44
. In both countries, the current electoral model produces an uneven 
participation of certain territorial units. Urban areas are extremely over-
represented compared to rural areas. In four Serbian legislatures from 2000 to 
2008, an average of 100 municipalities did not have a single representative, 
although these municipalities count over 1,500,000 voters, a million of whom 
go to the polls. By contrast, 39.2% of MPs came from the territory of Belgrade 
and Novi Sad, while the share of voters in these two cities in the total electorate 
                                               
40  Ibidem. 
41  Slobodan P. Orlović, “Kako do boljeg srpskog izbornog Sistema” (“How to Better 
Election System of Serbia”), Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law, University of Novi 
Sad, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2014, pp. 235 – 264, p. 249. 
42  David Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems ... cit, p. 73.  
43  Slaviša Orlović, “Izborni sistem i institucionalni dizajn’’ (“Electoral System and Institutional Design”), 
Zoran Stojiljković and Dušan Spasojević (eds.), Preporuke za izmenu izbornog zakonodavstva u Srbiji 
(Recommendations for Amending the Electoral Legislation in Serbia), pp. 31–50, National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, Belgrade, 2011, pp. 45–46. 
44  David Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems … cit, p. 69. 
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was only 26.9%
45
. In the previous Montenegrin legislature (October 2012–
October 2016), there were no MPs from four smaller municipalities; by 
contrast, nearly half the members of parliament (40 of 81) came from the 
territory of Podgorica and Nikšić, although the share of voters in these two 
cities in the whole electorate was only 39%.    In 
both countries, there appears to be a constant, namely a strengthening of the 
place and of the role of political parties in the electoral process at the expense of 
the remaining stakeholders in the elections – voters, candidates, and state 
authorities. Thus, the parties give themselves the exclusive right to define the 
framework of individual rights and obligations of participants in the electoral 
process
46
. Basically, such a system is susceptible to manipulation by political 
parties, and political parties in both countries control the entire process from the 
very beginning. In democracies where voters primarily identify with parties 
and/or where the electoral system gives the party the power to rank its 
candidates, the most important part of the electoral campaign for a potential 
candidate may be the party’s pre–selection process – to secure pre–selection for 
a “safe” constituency or a winnable position on the party’s list in a multi–
member constituency
47
. Candidate selection is not only relevant to the internal 
dynamics of parties; it also has signiﬁcant implications for democracy at the 
level of the political system
48
. In both Montenegro and Serbia, candidate 
selection is centralized in the hands of party leaders
49
. The campaigns are 
centralized and party-oriented, while the central leadership controls the total 
funds
50
. As political parties establish control of the process of nominating 
                                               
45  Milan Jovanović, “Redizajniranje izbornog sistema Srbije - jedan neuspeo pokušaj” (“Redesigning of 
the Electoral System in Serbia – A Failed Atempt”), Zoran Stojiljković and Dušan Spasojević (eds.), 
Preporuke za izmenu izbornog zakonodavstva u Srbiji (Recommendations for Amending the Electoral 
Legislation in Serbia),  pp. 21–30,  National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Belgrade, 2011,  
p.  26. 
46  Olga Popović-Obradović, Mijat Šuković and Veselin Pavićević, Parlamentarizam u Crnoj 
Gori (Parliamentarism in Montenegro), CID, Podgorica, 2002, p. 185. 
47  Norm Kelly and Sefakor Ashiagbor, Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and 
Practical Perspectives: Parliamentary Groups, National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs, Washington, 2013, p. 7. 
48  Scott Pruysers et al, “Candidate Selection Rules and Democratic Outcomes”, Susan E. 
Scarrow, Paul D. Webb, and Thomas Poguntke (eds.), Organizing Political Parties: 
Representation, Participation, and Power, pp. 208–233, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2017, p. 210. 
49  Party discipline is likely to be highest where candidate selection is centralized in the 
hands of party leaders, lowest where selection is not controlled by party organs, and 
legislators are likely to be pulled in different directions where candidate selection remains 
in party hands but is decentralized. Michael Gallagher, “Introduction”, Michael Gallagher 
and Michael Marsh (eds.), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret 
Garden of Politics, London, Sage, 1988, pp. 1-19. p. 15. 
50  The national budget allocates 0.6%, whereas municipalities are obliged to allocate 1% of 
their budget for the work of parliamentary political parties. According to official data, the 
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candidates, they further expand their control. For example, in Serbia there was 
even a legal provision
51
 empowering each political party to decide which 
candidate would become a member of parliament regardless of his or her 
position on the electoral party list. In Montenegro, the corresponding legal 
provision was more “democratic”. Parties had the power to decide which 
candidates in the second half of the electoral list would become a member of 
parliament. If the party won 20 seats in the election, the first 10 were assigned 
automatically to the first 10 representatives from the electoral list of that 
particular party. The next 10 seats would then be assigned to representatives 
from the list according to the political party’s decision, regardless of the 
representative’s position on the list52. Vujović concluded that in the first 14 
years of multi-partism in Montenegro, the party leaders: (1) controlled the 
process of candidate selection for MPs (2) determined who will become an MP 
from the candidate’s list regardless of the order on the list (3) indirectly 
deprived MPs of their seat by their exclusion from the party
53
. To the best of 
their abilities, political parties have developed specific instruments for 
establishing and maintaining full control over their representatives, the so-called 
blank–form resignation. The blank–form resignation is a specific contract 
between a political party and a representative, member of that political party. 
Basically, after the elections, every party candidate elected on a party list signs 
an undated resignation letter and deposits it with the leaders of the political 
party which had placed him or her on that political party electoral list. In case of 
unpredictable parliamentary discussions or voting records against the party or 
the leaders’ particular interests, the party simply needs to fill in the date on the 
blank–form resignation and activate it. As a result of this practice, political 
parties produced weak, replaceable MPs, a practice which further weakened 
parliament and all of its functions. 
The administrative committee of the Serbian parliament, controlled by 
political parties, bearing in mind party interests, legalized this practice through 
                                                                                                                   
share of private donations in the overall budget of political parties is insigniﬁcant.  Zlatko 
Vujović, ''The Impact of Personalization of Electoral System on Political Parties, The case 
of Montenegro'', Zoran Stojiljković and Dušan Spasojević (eds.), Voters, Parties, 
Elections – how to Democratize Political Parties in Montenegro and Serbia, pp. 49–68, 
CEMI, Podgorica, 2016, pp. 58–59. 
51  Law on the election of deputies, article 84, (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 
35/2000, 57/2003, 75/2003, 18/2004, 101/2005, 104/2009, 28/2011.) 
52  Vladimir Goati, “Parlamentarizam i partijski sistem Srbije” (“Parliamentarism and the 
Party System of Serbia”), Vukašin Pavlović and Slaviša Orlović (eds.), Dileme i izazovi 
parlamentarizma (The Dilemmas and Challenges of Parliamentarism), pp. 129–139, 
Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
Belgrade, 2007, p. 130. 
53  Zlatko Vujović, Nikoleta Tomović, “Perspectives for Development of Intra-Party 
Democracy in Montenegro'', Milan Jovanović (ed.), Comparative Balkan Politics, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, pp. 43–65, CEMI, Podgorica, 2016, p. 56. 
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accepting blank–form resignations regardless of the Constitutional Court 
decision from 2003 that guaranteed members of parliament the freedom to 
represent the people, without any legally binding party orders
54
. However, 
political parties established absolute dominance in a definitely original way – 
inserting in the new Constitution of 2006 a provision that allows a 
representative the ‘freedom’ to sign a blank–form resignation55. Such a 
provision was criticized by scholars. Marković argued that it concentrates great 
power in the hands of party leadership and violates the three principles that 
form the basis of representative democracy: that MPs represent voters and that 
their mandate is the relationship between voters and them; that MPs vote on 
their own conviction; that MPs cannot be revoked
56
. By bringing political 
parties into an open and unacceptable legal position to dispose of a 
parliamentary mandate, there is a justifiable risk of usurping power by taking 
over the role of the electorate and gaining sovereignty from citizens
57
. Goati 
concluded that in such circumstances, MPs were turned into temporary and 
replaceable holders of the party imperative mandate
58
. Quoting the 
replaceability of MPs, Orlović concluded that the political party actually 
                                               
54  The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia declared unconstitutional the 
provisions  of article 88 of the Law on the election of national deputies. According to the 
Law, the mandate of a representative stops if his membership of a political party (or 
coalition from whose list he is selected) is terminated, or if the party is deleted from the 
register of the political parties or political organizations from whose list he is selected. 
The Constitutional Court held that an MP has a constitutionally guaranteed freedom in 
representing those who elected him and cannot be bound by legally binding party orders. 
Given that being a member of a political party is not a condition for the exercise of 
passive suffrage, a member cannot lose the achieved passive suffrage even if his party 
membership is terminated, due  to a disagreement with the Constitution in art. 13 and 42. 
Regardless of the mode of running under the Constitution, the candidate acquires the 
status of MP by citizens’ choice (article 74, paragraph 2), and from that moment becomes 
a representative of the citizens (article 76 of the Constitution) through which citizens 
exercise their sovereign rights (pursuant to article 2 position 2. Constitution). Making the 
mandate dependent on membership of a political party is not in compliance with the 
provisions of art. 2, 13, 44 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of political 
action. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, IV-197/2002, оf 27. V 2003, 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 57/2003). 
55  “Under the terms stipulated by the Law, a deputy shall be free to irrevocably put his/her 
term of office at disposal to the political party upon which proposal he or she has been 
elected a deputy.” Constitution of Serbia of 2006, article 102, paragraph 2. 
56  Ratko Marković, Ustavno pravo (Constitutional Law), Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2010, 
p. 246. 
57  Irena Pejić, “Koncept narodnog predstavništva i kontraverze o parlamentarnom mandatu u 
srpskom ustavu”, (“Concept of National Representation and Controversy on the 
Parliamentary Mandate in the Serbian Constitution”), Nova srpska politička misao, 
Belgrade, 2007, pp. 3-8, p. 4. 
58  Vladimir Goati, Političke partije i partijski sistemi (Political Parties and Party Systems), 
Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 2008, p. 117. 
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became a representative of voters' interests and the most direct participant in the 
legislative process
59
. Finally, blank–form resignations were shelved in 2011 by 
changing the existing law regulating the electoral system
60
. Political parties had 
lost legal control over their representatives and were trying to establish the 
moral obligation for MPs to return the mandate to the party in case the party 
requested it.  
Montenegro had a somewhat similar experience. Despite the fact that 
Montenegro proclaimed the concept of the free representational mandate in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro of 1992
61
, it still allowed the 
possibility for the existing imperative mandate to be brought back through the 
back door in the period 1995–2004, when parliament passed amendments to the 
Law on the election of councillors and representatives, allowing political parties 
to own the mandate of representatives, also allowing the party to exclude an MP 
from parliament if he or she left the party itself
62
. This translates into MPs 
automatically losing their mandate when they decide to leave the party 
(voluntarily or by expulsion). This controversial situation was resolved by a 
decision of the Constitutional Court
63
. Under this decision, members of 
                                               
59
  Slobodan P. Orlović, Načelo podele vlasti u ustavnom razvoju Srbije (The principle of the 
Division of Power in the Constitutional Development of Serbia), Faculty of Law, 
University of Belgrade, 2008, p. 158. 
60  Petrov considered it inappropriate. “The attempt to correct a bad constitutional provision 
by law is to undermine the dignity of the Constitution and the principles of the free 
parliamentary mandate”. Vladan Petrov, “Zakon o izmenama i dopunama zakona o izboru 
odbornika i poslanika od 2011 – Da li je poslanički mandat konačno slobodan?” (“The 
Law on Altering and Amending the Law on Election of Deputies of 2011 – Is the 
Mandate of  Deputy Finally Free?”), Oliver Nikolić and Vladimir Đurić (eds.), Izbori u 
domaćem i  stranom pravu (Elections in Domestic and Foreign Law), pp. 94–106, 
Institute of  Comparative Law, Belgrade, 2012, p. 105. 
61  “Every deputy shall decide and vote according to his own belief and may not be 
recalled.”Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro of 1992, article 77, paragraph 3. 
62  “The term of office of councilor and/or representative shall be terminated before its expiry 
in the case of termination of membership in a political party on whose list he was 
elected.” Law on Amendments to the Law on Election of Councillors and 
Representatives, (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 16/95, article 104, 
paragraph 8). 
63  The Montenegrin Constitutional Court found that the Law does not comply with article 77 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, stipulating that members of parliament 
vote according to their own conscience and that they cannot be recalled, as well as with 
article 107 of the Constitution, stipulating that the law must be in conformity with the 
Constitution. Since neither the Constitution, nor the Law provides for membership of a 
political party as a condition for election candidacy, the loss of such a status cannot be 
grounds for termination. An MP is a representative of all the citizens and not of the party 
which nominated him. This disputed provision is not in accordance with article 3 of the 
Constitution, which stipulates that sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise power 
directly and through freely chosen representatives. Therefore, the representative whose 
membership of a political party was terminated, may result in his having political or moral 
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parliament were to keep their seat even if the party revoked their membership. 
Unlike Serbia, though, Montenegro did not practise blank–form resignation and 
there was no violation of the Constitutional Court’s decision. Although the 
current Constitution of 2006 provides a free mandate, Pajvančić claims that the 
decisive influence of the parties on the distribution of the mandate, as well as on 
MPs’ freedom of making decision, reshapes the nature of the mandate64.  
Besides, the fact that a parliamentary seat belongs to an individual MP – 
not to the party (which was confirmed by the decisions of the Constitutional 
Courts of both countries), further compounds the problem. When voting for the 
party list, more precisely for the party leaders, people incidentally choose as 
their representatives certain members of parliament without considering them 
personally or even knowing who they are. When representatives, elected this 
way, change political parties or become independent MPs, they keep their seats 
despite a lack of legitimacy. As a result of this practice, nearly 20% of MPs (15 
out of 81) from the previous Montenegrin legislature were either independent 
members, or MPs that changed party affiliation. Although this mainly resulted 
in a fragmentation of the opposition and did not cause a change in the ruling 
majority, it has been shown that such a situation can undermine the legitimacy 
of the entire parliament
65
. The situation is compounded when we consider that 
in parliament we have representatives of political parties which did not take part 
in the election process, or even exist on election day (so–called ‘unelected 
representation’)66. In the period from 2003 to 2005, there were four such cases 
recorded in Serbia. This is how the Serbian Renewal Movement returned to 
parliament after its collapse in the elections, as well as the newly established 
Group 17, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Strength of Serbia Movement
67
. 
Members of parliament become vulnerable to the influence of big business, 
which believes that it is appropriate to exercise their business interests through 
                                                                                                                   
responsibility, but not in a legal sanction of revocation of the mandate because it was not 
constitutionally prescribed. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, no. 
14/04, of 18. VI 2004, (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 45/2004). 
64  Marijana Pajvančić, “Parlamentarni sistem, unapređenje i modernizacija kompetitivnosti – 
ekspertska vizija” (“Parliamentary system, improvement and modernization of 
competitiveness - expert vision”), Mijat Šuković (ed.), Crna Gora u XXI stoljeću – u eri 
kompetitivnosti, (Montenegro in the 21st Century - in the Era of Competitiveness), pp. 
167–212, CANU, 73/5, Podgorica, 2010, p. 176. 
65  Petar Šturanović, Zakonodavna nadležnost skupštine u savremenom parlamentarnom 
sistemu, (Legislative Competence of the Assembly in Contemporary Parliamentary 
System),  p. 247. 
66  Bogoljub Milosavljević, “Teorija političkog predstavništva i poslanički mandate” 
(“Theory  of Political Representation and the Parliamentary Mandate”), Pravo i Politika, 
Vol. 4, No.  1, 2011, p. 22. 
67  Zoran Stojiljković, “Političke partije i demokratija” (“Political Parties and Democracy”), 
Zoran Stojiljković (ed.), Politička sociologija savremenog društva (Political Sociology of 
Contemporary Society), pp. 291–369, Zavod za udžbenike, Belgrade, 2014, p. 323. 
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MPs, whether the MPs belong to the ruling party or to the opposition. A certain 
MP obviously did not hesitate to exercise the power of the “financial argument” 
and left the political party whose electoral list he belonged to (the SPS, Socialist 
Party of Serbia) to become the first representative of the Strength of Serbia 
Movement, which was founded by Bogoljub Karić, a well–known millionaire. 
This case was followed in 2008 by a split in the SRS, (Serbian Radical Party), 
when the future head of state Tomislav Nikolić took with him other 19 members 
of the Serbian Radical Party and established the parliamentary group “Forward, 
Serbia”; although the current ruling party Serbian Progressive Party – SNS 
(which was represented by that group then) still did not participate in the 
elections. The first legislature after the final establishment of a free mandate in 
2011 (which lasted only two years: 2012–2014) saw the election of 11 deputies 
who changed party affiliation. In these circumstances, Norton's claim that 
“although there is a sense that MPs should have more autonomy – the reality is that 
party control is much ‘safer’ for the working of democracy”, seems justified68. 
 
 
The effects of an electoral reform on the parliamentary 
mandate in Serbia and Montenegro 
 
Three elements combine to shape the nature of the legislative system and 
the legislative capacity of the assembly: (1) the constitutional rules, particularly 
the nature of the electoral system; (2) the structure of the legislature, whether 
unicameral or bicameral; (3) the enactment procedures, which include such 
matters as “agenda control” and the existence of minority veto provisions69. The 
electoral system has to be a tool which transfers the people's political will to 
their representatives in parliament and a mechanism which largely determines 
not only the party system
70
, but also the strength of the representatives. In this 
sense, we could reflect on the effects in both Montenegro and Serbia of an 
electoral reform which would give MPs the legitimacy they lack, enabling the 
entire parliament to function as a truly representative and legislative body. 
                                               
68  Philip Norton and Cristina Leston–Bandeira, “The Impact of Democratic Practice on the 
Parliaments of Southern Europe”, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, 
pp. 177–185, p. 178. 
69  David Arter, “Introduction: Comparing the Legislative Performance of Legislatures”, 
Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3–4, 2006, pp. 245–257, p. 249. 
70  In that sense, Maurice Duverger defines three basic laws: 1. Proportional representation 
tends to lead to the formation of many independent parties. 2. The two-ballot majority 
system tends to lead to the formation of many parties that are allied with each other. 3. 
The plurality rule tends to produce a two-party system. Maurice Duverger, “Duverger’s 
Law: Forty Years Later”, Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and 
their Political Consequences, pp. 69–84, Agathon, New York, 1986, p. 70. 
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However, electoral reforms are prone to face problems, but these could be 
reduced by taking into consideration the structure of cleavages in society, as 
well as tradition and history
71
.   A number of proposals for 
electoral reform have already been put forward, all of which however might 
have negative long-term effects. For example, in order to achieve a stronger 
connection between MPs and voters, Jovanović proposed either a majority 
system or a personalized proportional system with several constituencies
72
. 
Živković proposed preserving a proportional electoral system, but with several 
smaller constituencies, with an electoral census of 10%
73. Pejić proposed 
changing the electoral system by introducing a mixed model combining the 
majority election system and the proportional representation system, and 
increasing the electoral census for coalition lists
74
. Regarding the possible 
effects of an electoral reform on the party system, Orlović believes that a 
fragmentation of parliament could be avoided by the introduction of some kind 
of majority or mixed-member system
75
. Besides the gerrymandering issue
76
, 
such a radical change could potentially create a much more serious problem to 
worry about. Creating constituencies could be a step forward to some kind of 
eventual territorial autonomy. We may assume that every minority group, 
whether ethnic majority or religious majority (in states with a high degree of 
ethnic and religious diversity)
77
, and also political parties that represent their 
                                               
71  Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering…cit., p. 147. 
72  Milan Jovanović, “Redizajniranje izbornog sistema Srbije - jedan neuspeo pokušaj” 
(“Redesigning of the Electoral System in Serbia – A Failed Atempt”), p. 29.  
73  Miroslav Živković, “Izborni sistemi i reforma izbornog sistema u Republici Srbiji'' 
(“Electoral Systems and the Reform of Electoral System of the Republic of Serbia”), 
Megatrend Review, Vol. 14, No. 7, 2017, pp. 107–116, p. 114. 
74  Irena Pejić, “Fundamental Values in New Democracies: The Principle of Representation 
in Serbian Constitution”, Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law, University of Niš, Vol. 8. 
No. 67, pp. 169–184, p. 180.   
75  Slaviša Orlović, “Političke posljedice izbornog sistema u Srbiji” (“Political Consequences 
of the Electoral System in Serbia”), Politički život, No. 4, pp. 19–36, p. 34. 
76  This refers to the practice in which constituency boundaries are redrawn with the intention 
of producing an inflated number of seats for a party, usually the governing party. The 
term “gerrymander” came from the shape of a constituency designed by Governor 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts in 1812. It was so long, narrow and wiggly that one 
journalist thought it looked like a salamander, and it was accordingly dubbed a 
gerrymander. David Farrell,  Comparing Electoral Systems, pp. 8–9. 
77  Montenegro is a country with a highly heterogeneous population, with no clear ethnic 
majority. According to the 2011 population census, 44.98% of the population declare 
themselves as Montenegrins. Among the others, most numerous are Serbs (28.73%), 
Bosniaks (8.65%), Albanians (4.91%) Muslims (3.31%), Roma (1.01%), and Croats 
(0.97%). Statistical Office of Montenegro, “Census of Population, Households and 
Dwellings in Montenegro”, Podgorica, 2011. Serbia is also ethnically diverse, with more 
than twenty national minorities. Among them, the most numerous are Hungarians 
(3.53%), Roma (2.05%), Bosniaks (2.02%) Albanians (approx. 0.82%), and Croats 
(0.81%). Except for the Roma, other national minorities are territorially concentrated in 
440  PETAR ŠTURANOVIĆ 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 3 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interests, would see that as an opportunity for raising a number of other issues. 
To start off with, they could request specific constituencies in the part of the 
country where minorities are dominant, and they could then use this as an 
argument for reaching autonomy for some newly established region in the 
future, or even for secession in the long run
78
. Considering previous 
disintegration processes, it seems extremely likely that neither country would 
handle such claims properly. The mixed–member proportional system is a 
combination of proportional system and plurality system where people have two 
votes: one for a constituency MP and one for a party list. Although the mixed–
member proportional system integrates the strengths of both the proportional 
and the plurality systems, it also produces a hybrid that combines their 
disadvantages. For a number of reasons, it seems reasonable to believe that a 
plurality electoral system, or any kind of electoral system that includes 
establishing multiple single-member constituencies, such as the mixed-member 
proportional system, would probably not be appropriate for either Montenegro 
or Serbia. First of all, any former communist society is likely to be unprepared 
for the major disproportion between cast votes and mandates, which is the main 
characteristic of the plurality system. One could therefore speculate that such a 
system would in the beginning reinstate one extremely strong party and discard 
a large number of votes, and it would be characterized by a lack of political 
alternative and unrepresented interests, which would also be the result if the 
election census was raised. 
As Lijphart makes clear, very few countries have replaced the 
proportional electoral system with the plurality electoral system or vice versa 
because tradition is extremely important in what concerns the electoral 
system
79
. If the electoral system prioritizes proportionality, a high degree of 
voter participation, and personal accountability of MPs, then the choice will 
gravitate towards an open–list80. An efficient electoral system for a 
representative democratic government must include appropriate rules for both 
                                                                                                                   
particular regions or  municipalities in Serbia. Most of the minority groups are politically 
organized around their “own” minority political parties. Jelena Lončar, “Electoral 
Accountability and Substantive  Representation of National Minorities: The Case of 
Serbia”, East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2016, 
pp. 703–724, p. 708. 
78  With the advancement of Albanian nationalism after the partial recognition of Kosovo, 
and then taking a stronger role in Macedonia (after forming a government in 2017 which 
signiﬁcantly modiﬁed the course of its foreign policy), there is a possibility that the 
Albanian minority of Montenegro may push more strongly for some kind of autonomy. 
Boris Vukićević, “Foreign Relations of Post-Independence Montenegro: A Change of 
Direction'', Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 36, 2017, pp. 107–135, p. 121. 
79  Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 1999, 
p. 171. 
80  Michael Gallagher, “Conclusion”, Michael Gallagher, Paul Mitchell, (eds.), The Politics 
of Electoral Systems, pp. 535–578, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 575.  
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party representation and personal representation
81
. Therefore, accepting open 
lists as a way to personalize the existing electoral system could be an effective 
solution to bring back legitimacy to parliament and their MPs. Preferential 
voting gives the voter a high degree of influence over the electoral process, 
making election more personal. Open lists allow voters to control the selection 
process depending on the number of preferences that are given to the voters 
themselves. Open lists will produce intra–party competition where candidates 
will ﬁnd that they can attract more preference votes by staking out a distinct 
position from their co–partisans, which will develop more ideas and policies. 
On the other hand, Pejić wonders who will agree to a candidacy in a closed list 
system that does not have any prospect of success, unless there are some real 
benefits or unless perhaps they are pressurized or blackmailed?
82
 Under a 
closed–list system, for example, MPs seem to be entirely dependent upon their 
party’s candidate selectors and could afford to disregard the voters, but under an 
open–list system, MPs need personal support from the voters and can be expected 
to be very responsive to them and to be active in locally related activities
83
 . 
The MPs’ affiliation to a certain party has been shown to be a decisive 
factor in his/her actions whenever a bill is brought forward and that is to a large 
extent a reflection of the electoral system
84
. Preferential voting entails a high 
legislative turnover. The possibility of rewarding or punishing individual 
legislators leads to more legislators being voted out and newcomers being voted 
in than in a system without preferential voting
85
. Carroll and Nalepa argue that 
MPs who win particularly large vote shares will be more costly to discipline. 
Since they cannot be credibly punished without harming party performance, 
they should be subject to discipline less often, which will lead to their greater 
disloyalty on average compared to those MPs who secure fewer votes (who can 
thus be more easily subject to discipline)
86
. In the specific context of the 
European Parliament, Simon Hix found that in systems with open list PR, large 
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districts, or decentralized candidate selection, MEPs are more independent 
agents and hence are freer to vote with their European party groups and against 
their national parties.
87
 Thus, preferential voting would loosen an excessively 
tight connection between the MP and the political party to which he or she 
belongs
88
. MPs elected this way could leave the party and keep their seats 
without the question of lacking legitimacy. There would be no reason to worry 
that voters’ preferences and political will could be lost between parties and 
MPs. Preferential voting would increase the political visibility of candidates, 
and also reward personal qualifications of candidates and MPs who fulfil their 
tasks effectively. MPs would keep close contact with their constituencies in 
order to secure their re-election
89
. Preferential voting would reduce the problem 
of fragmented parliament
90
 through the elimination of minor parties who were 
able to gain parliamentary status by coalition with the main parties.
91
 Even 
candidates themselves believe that some sort of preferential voting system 
would be better for the development of democracy
92
. Despite difficulties in 
providing exact figures, it is safe to say that varieties of preferential voting are 
common among countries using a proportional list system. Their stronghold is 
Western Europe, from where they have spread to some newer democracies on 
the European continent
93
. The preferential proportional electoral system is used 
in other countries in the region, such as Croatia, which is a member of the EU. 
 Moving from less accountable systems (such as closed–list) to more 
accountable ones (such as open–list) is always likely to be acceptable to the 
voters, but lack of political will from the parties might prove a major obstacle. 
In such new circumstances, it can be expected that political parties will adopt a 
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different approach in order to be able to retain the power to influence the voters’ 
preferences. In this sense, the Italian experience in manipulating preferential 
voting serves as an example.
94
 Some initial difficulties might arise with vote 
counting and with the distribution of mandates at the end of the election 
process. However, these difficulties concern mere technical issues and seem 
negligible compared to the positive effects that such an electoral reform would 
generate.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the past two centuries, institutions have gone through phases of change 
in their functioning. In the process of evolution of parliamentarism, fluctuations 
in the strength of the representative body were inevitable. However, what has 
been of great concern to many researchers in the field more recently is the 
intensity of the process which harms parliament and threatens to marginalize the 
legislative body completely and to reduce it to a mere formality. The present 
paper has applied the theoretical framework of the literature that supports the 
thesis that the modern parliament is being marginalized, to the cases of the 
Montenegrin and Serbian legislatures as ex–communist countries without a 
strong parliamentary tradition, where the challenges facing modern parliament 
are even greater. In these countries the main difference with the previous one–
party system is that instead of one oligarchy, there are several party oligarchies 
that have a crucial influence on the personnel composition of the representative 
body, so that we now have “monism within pluralism”95. In the light of the 
extensive literature review and the case study analysis undertaken in this paper, 
the general conclusion seems to be that political parties, which dominate 
parliamentary procedures and the political process, have reshaped the nature of 
the representative parliamentary mandate in transitional Montenegro and Serbia. 
It was found that parties have taken control of the process of candidate selection 
for MPs, centralized the campaigns, established full control over their MPs 
through blank-form resignation and violated decisions of the Constitutional 
Court. Therefore, as Orlović remarks, parliament with politically inferior 
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representatives, practically unelected from the people, has turned into a 
government servant
 96
. The literature has also pointed out that the EU 
integration process has further weakened the national parliaments of both the 
Member States and of Montenegro and Serbia. 
The meaning of representative democracy, as enshrined in the 
Montenegrin and Serbian Constitutions, is that voters’ sovereignty is transferred 
to their representatives (MPs) and not to political parties. As Goati, Pejić and 
Vujović have argued, the existing electoral system (proportional with closed 
lists) has many weaknesses and produces members of parliament that are 
political parties’ soldiers instead of citizens’ representatives. In such 
circumstances, it could prove profitable to retain the fairness of the proportional 
system and to improve it by revitalizing relations between MPs and the citizens 
who elect them, through preferential voting. It is to be hoped that stronger 
relations between voters and their representatives would restore the missing 
legitimacy to MPs, who would then be able to practice the free mandate, 
unbound by anybody’s instructions or demands. Their political careers would be 
in the hands of the people, not in the hands of the leaders of the political parties, 
so representatives would not have to be obedient to the party and their 
leadership for fear of not being re–elected as members of parliament. Such a 
system would enable a greater degree of voters’ influence on the personnel 
composition of parliament to encourage greater activity and responsibility of 
MPs during their mandates. As Farrell makes abundantly clear, candidate–based 
electoral systems, and particularly those, which facilitate preferential voting, 
provide greater scope for voters to act strategically when voting; they also help 
to tie the politicians into a closer relationship with their voters, encouraging 
closer attention to constituency work
97
. 
 Some scholars argue that the EU integration process can contribute to 
the democratization of political parties, saying that it is plausible to expect that 
parties in new EU Member States will have experienced less change than their 
counterparts in long-standing Member States. However, this may only be the 
case in countries where parties are strongly institutionalized; parties in post-
communist countries may adapt particularly quickly to the systemic imperatives 
of European multilevel governance because they tend to lack strong 
organizational and ideological traditions
98
. The comprehensive survey presented 
in this article contributes to the study of the post-communist parliamentary 
regimes of South Eastern Europe, particularly those of the countries that are on 
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the path to EU integration. Finally, it points the way for politically important 
lines of future research. In particular, how much has the desire of the candidate 
countries to adopt the acquis communautaire as soon as possible, with the aim 
of faster accession to the European Union, caused a weakening of the legislative 
function of the parliament?  
